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Recent research in cognitive neuroscience using virtual reality, robotic technology and brain imaging has linked self-
consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals. This work on bodily self-consciousness has
implicated the temporo-parietal, premotor and extrastriate cortex and partly originated in work on neurological patients with
different disorders of bodily self-consciousness. One class of such disorders is autoscopic phenomena, which are defined as
illusory own-body perceptions, during which patients experience the visual illusory reduplication of their own body in extra-
personal space. Three main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined. During autoscopic hallucinations, a second own
body is seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness. During out-of-body experiences, the second own body is seen
from an elevated perspective and location associated with disembodiment. During heautoscopy, subjects report strong
self-identification with the second own body, often associated with the experience of existing at and perceiving the world
from two places at the same time. Although it has been proposed that each autoscopic phenomenon is associated with different
impairments of bodily self-consciousness, past research on neurological patients and the development of experimental para-
digms for the study of bodily self-consciousness has focused on out-of-body experiences and the association with
temporo-parietal cortex. Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis in the—to date—largest group of patients with auto-
scopic hallucination and heautoscopy and compared the location of brain damage with those of control patients suffering from
complex visual hallucinations. We found that heautoscopy was associated with lesions to the left posterior insula, and that
autoscopic hallucinations were associated with damage to the right occipital cortex. Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy
were further associated with distinct symptoms and deficits. The present data suggest that the autoscopic hallucination is
a visuo-somatosensory deficit implicating extrastriate cortex and is, despite the visual hallucination of the own body, not
associated with major deficits in bodily self-consciousness. Based on the symptoms and deficits in patients with heautoscopy
and the implication of the left posterior insula, we suggest that abnormal bodily self-consciousness during heautoscopy is
caused by a breakdown of self–other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experience due to a disintegration of
visuo-somatosensory signals with emotional (and/or interoceptive) bodily signals. These brain mechanisms are distinct from
those described for out-of-body experiences. The present data extend previous models of autoscopic phenomena and provide
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clinical evidence for the importance of emotional and interoceptive signal processing in the posterior insula in relation to bodily
self-consciousness.
Keywords: autoscopic phenomena; lesion analysis; posterior insula; multisensory integration; embodiment; bodily
self-consciousness
Introduction
Autoscopic phenomena [from the Greek autos (self) and skopeo
(looking at)] are dramatic illusory own-body perceptions and en-
compass a wide range of experiences involving the visual illusory
reduplication of one’s own body in extrapersonal space. Three
main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined, and
these include out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004;
Brandt et al., 2005; De Ridder et al., 2007; Heydrich et al.,
2011), autoscopic hallucinations (Maillard et al., 2004; Zamboni
et al., 2005; Blanke et al., 2008) and heautoscopy (Brugger et al.,
1994, 2006; Tadokoro et al., 2006). Although autoscopic phe-
nomena have been reported in various focal and generalized dis-
orders of the CNS for a long time (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1946),
they have only recently been investigated with the modern tools
of cognitive neuroscience and neurology (Easton et al., 2009;
Bolognini et al., 2010).
During an out-of-body experience, the patient has the subject-
ive feeling of being awake and experiences the ‘self’ or centre
of awareness, as being located outside the physical body, at a
somewhat elevated level (abnormal self-location). It is from
this elevated extrapersonal location that the patient’s body and
the world are perceived (abnormal first-person perspective)
(Devinsky et al., 1989; Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004).
Most patients experience seeing their own body (autoscopy) as
lying on the ground or in bed, and the experience tends to be
described as vivid and realistic. Thus, self-identification with a
body, that is the sensation of owning a body, is experienced at
the elevated disembodied location and not at the location of the
physical body (abnormal self-identification) (Table 1).
Out-of-body experiences have been reported in patients suffer-
ing from many different aetiologies (Devinsky et al., 1989;
Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004). A recent lesion analysis
study using voxel-based lesion symptom mapping in the—to
date—largest sample of patients with out-of-body experiences
due to focal brain damage, however, revealed a well-localized
origin centred at the right angular gyrus and posterior superior
temporal gyrus (Ionta et al., 2011). Based on the frequent asso-
ciation of out-of-body experiences with visuo-somatosensory illu-
sions, abnormal vestibular sensations (Blanke and Mohr, 2005;
Lopez et al., 2008) and the role of the temporo-parietal junction
in multisensory integration (Calvert et al., 2000; Bremmer et al.,
2001), it has been suggested that out-of-body experiences occur
owing to disturbed multisensory integration of bodily signals in
personal (somatosensory, visual and proprioceptive) and extraper-
sonal space (visual and vestibular) (Blanke et al., 2004; Ionta
et al., 2011).
Because past research on autoscopic phenomena has mostly
focused on out-of-body experiences, the neurological mechanisms
of autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy are less well under-
stood. During autoscopic hallucination, patients experience seeing
an image of their body in extrapersonal space as if they were
looking into a mirror, while self-location, self-identification and
the first-person perspective remain unaffected (Table 1) (Fe´re´,
1891; Brugger, 2002). Autoscopic hallucinations are mostly of
brief duration (for exception, see Zamboni et al., 2005), often
accompanied by visual hallucinations or visual illusions, and asso-
ciated with visual field deficits (Ko¨lmel, 1985; Blanke and Mohr,
2005) that may be lateralized to the affected visual field (Ko¨lmel,
1985). Moreover, patients often experience seeing their own face
or the upper part of the trunk and only rarely their entire body
(Blanke and Castillo, 2007).
Autoscopic hallucinations due to various neurological disorders
such as migraine (Lippman, 1953) and focal epilepsy (Blanke
et al., 2004; Maillard et al., 2004), as well as ischaemic and neo-
plastic brain damage of the occipital and/or occipito-parietal lobe
Table 1 Classification criteria for heautoscopy, out-of-body experience and autoscopic hallucinations, as well as lesion
location suggested by previous case reports and small case series
Autoscopic hallucination Out-of-body experience Heautoscopy
Self-location Centred at physical body, stable Centred at illusory body, stable Centred at physical and/or illusory
body, unstable
Self-identification With physical body With illusory body With physical and/or illusory body
First-person perspective Centred at physical body, stable Centred at illusory body, stable Centred at physical and/or illusory
body, unstable
Second own body
(autoscopic body)
2D image of own body, often of
the face and upper trunk
3D image of whole own body 3D image of whole own body
Vividness/realism Low High High
Lesion location Bilateral, occipital, temporal Right, temporal, parietal Left, temporal, parietal
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(Maillard et al., 2004; Zamboni et al., 2005), have been reported.
Based on the frequent association with visual field deficits and
other visual hallucinations, it has been argued that autoscopic hal-
lucinations are a visual disorder (Fe´re´, 1891; Sollier, 1903;
Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952),
and several dysfunctional visual or vision-related mechanisms
have been proposed: abnormal visual imagery (Coleman, 1934),
hypnagogic visual hallucination (Lukianowicz, 1958), aberrant
plasticity after cortical damage in the early visual cortex
(Zamboni et al., 2005) or a release phenomenon (Devinsky
et al., 1989). More recently, it has been proposed that autoscopic
hallucinations are a disorder of multisensory integration in personal
space (due to conflicting cortical signal integration from vision,
proprioception and touch) (Blanke et al., 2004; Maillard et al.,
2004; Bolognini et al., 2010).
The third form of autoscopic phenomenon is heautoscopy and
has been conceptualized as an intermediate form between
autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experience. As in
out-of-body experiences and autoscopic hallucinations, the patient
with heautoscopy has the impression of seeing an image of his
body in extrapersonal space. However, it is often difficult for the
patient with heautoscopy to decide whether they are disembodied
and whether the centre of conscious experience is localized within
the physical body or the autoscopic body (Table 1) (Blanke et al.,
2004). This is associated with strong self-identification and close
affinity with the autoscopic body (Devinsky et al., 1989; Brugger,
2002; Blanke and Mohr, 2005), which may even persist if the
autoscopic body only partly reflects the patient’s visual bodily ap-
pearance (Brugger, 2002; Blanke and Mohr, 2005). It has been
argued that such illusory self-identification may be related to the
frequent report of echopraxia [e.g. the experienced imitation of
the patient’s movements by the autoscopic body (Lukianowicz,
1958; Brugger et al., 2006)] or feelings of detachment from
emotional and bodily processing concerning the patient’s physical
body (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935; Lukianowicz, 1958; Devinsky
et al., 1989; Brugger, 2002).
A further difference exists between heautoscopy with respect to
out-of-body experiences and autoscopic hallucinations; patients
with heautoscopy may report to experience existing at two
places at the same time (bi-location), often associated with alter-
nating or simultaneous self-locations and first-person perspectives
at the physical and the autoscopic body (Sollier, 1903; Brugger
et al., 1994; Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004). Heautoscopy
has also been linked to various neurological (Lippman, 1953;
Blanke et al., 2004) and psychiatric conditions (Lukianowicz,
1958, 1963). These include temporal lobe epilepsy (Devinsky
et al., 1989; Brugger et al., 1994; Tadokoro et al., 2006),
neoplasia originating in the insular cortex (Brugger et al., 2006),
typhoid fever (Fe´re´, 1891; Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1946), mi-
graine (Lippman, 1953), schizophrenia (Lukianowicz, 1963) and
depression (Lukianowicz, 1958; Arenz, 2001). Functionally, many
hypotheses have been proposed, suggesting that heautoscopy
represents a vestibular disorder (Bonnier, 1905; Ionasescu, 1960;
Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1961; Gru¨sser and Landis, 1991), aber-
rant visual memory (Dewhurst and Pearson, 1955), dissociative
disease (Devinsky et al., 1989) and descriptive psychological ac-
counts such as externalization of the ‘somatic ego’ (Lunn, 1970),
projection of suppressed desires (Fe´re´, 1891) or pathological grief
reaction (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935).
Recent models account for heautoscopy, autoscopic hallucin-
ations and out-of-body experiences within a common model, pro-
posing that heautoscopy is based on abnormal integration of
multisensory signals in personal space (as mentioned earlier in
the text) as well as extrapersonal space (of visuo-vestibular
signals) (Blanke et al., 2004, 2008). However, we note that
these accounts of heautoscopy and autoscopic hallucinations are
almost entirely based on single case reports (Brugger et al., 1994,
2006; Arenz, 2001; Zamboni et al., 2005) or small case series
(Fe´re´, 1891; Devinsky et al., 1989; Blanke et al., 2004).
Moreover, data regarding the exact lesion location of autoscopic
hallucinations and heautoscopy are missing because, to date, no
quantitative lesion analysis [e.g. lesion overlap, voxel-based lesion
symptom mapping (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007)] has
been carried out.
Major advances in lesion analysis have permitted us to analyse,
with high spatial resolution, whether symptoms are associated
with circumscribed brain regions. These approaches are based on
statistical analysis at the group level and voxel-wise quantitative
statistical analysis (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007; Ionta
et al., 2011). Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis
using MRIcron (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron)
(Rorden et al., 2007) and compared the distribution of brain le-
sions in the—to date—largest sample of patients with heautoscopy
and with autoscopic hallucinations with those of control patients.
This was combined with an in-depth analysis of several phenom-
enological aspects and neurological deficits in patients with heau-
toscopy and autoscopic hallucinations.
Based on earlier work (Blanke and Mohr, 2005) and differences
in associated symptoms, we had three major predictions concern-
ing brain damage. We hypothesized that autoscopic hallucinations
and heautoscopy would be caused by damage to distinct brain
regions (lesion overlap analysis). Moreover, given the strong alter-
ation of bodily self-consciousness in heautoscopy (abnormal
self-location, self-identification and first-person perspective), we
predicted that brain damage in patients with heautoscopy will
be significantly different from that in our control group of patients
with complex visual hallucinations but preserved bodily
self-consciousness, and affects regions in proximity to those re-
cently described in abnormal states of bodily self-consciousness
(Ionta et al., 2011). Finally, we hypothesized that the lesion over-
lap in patients with autoscopic hallucinations will not differ from
that in a control group, as patients with autoscopic hallucinations
and the control group both suffer from frequent visual symptoms
and have preserved bodily self-consciousness.
Patients and methods
Patients
We included nine patients suffering from heautoscopy (mean age:
37.8 years, four female, all right handed) and seven patients suffering
from autoscopic hallucinations (mean age: 33.8 years, four female, all
right-handed) due to circumscribed structural brain lesions and/or
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localized neural dysfunction due to focal epilepsy (Tables 2 and 3).
Inclusion criteria were that heautoscopy or autoscopic hallucinations of
neurological origin were caused by either focal brain damage (mea-
sured with MRI or CT) or a circumscribed zone of seizure onset (con-
firmed by intracranial EEG recording). Furthermore, we required the
availability of a sufficient amount of detail about the autoscopic hal-
lucinations or heautoscopy so that they could be classified with cer-
tainty. The patients were recruited at the Department of Neurology at
Geneva University Hospital or from other clinical research groups,
where the original neuroradiological data were available for analysis.
Several of the patients have been reported previously by different
authors in the form of case reports or small case series (Brugger
et al., 1994, 2006; Maillard et al., 2004; Zamboni et al., 2005;
Tadokoro et al., 2006; Bolognini et al., 2010).
The control group consisted of 14 patients with complex visual hal-
lucinations who were recruited during the same time period at the
Geneva University Hospital (Supplementary Table 1). Complex visual
hallucinations consisted of people and/or faces without disturbance of
bodily self-consciousness (normal self-location, self-identification and
first-person perspective) and were also due to circumscribed brain
lesions.
Classification of autoscopic phenomena
Based on the criteria used previously (Brugger, 2002; Blanke and
Mohr, 2005), we classified cases as having heautoscopy or autoscopic
hallucinations based on the available data concerning the first-person
perspective (e.g. from where the patients reported to perceive the
world), self-location (e.g. the location in space where the patients
experience to be) and self-identification (e.g. the degree to which
the patients identify with a body).
Phenomenology and associated
symptoms
We assessed the phenomenology of heautoscopy and autoscopic hal-
lucinations and, if reported, the presence of mirror-reversal of the
autoscopic body and scene, as well as echopraxia. We further analysed
the associated symptoms, such as visceral sensations (nausea, vomit-
ing, palpitations), vestibular sensations (rotation, sensation of falling or
flying, lightness and heaviness), visual field deficits and simple visual
hallucinations (e.g. colours, light flashes), somatosensory deficits and
associated emotions. Results of an extensive neuropsychological exam-
ination were also analysed (Blanke et al., 2004).
Lesion mapping and spatial
normalization
Brain pathology was confirmed using a multimodality imaging ap-
proach relying on a combination of MRI (n = 28, 93%), CT (n = 4,
13%), ictal and interictal scalp EEG (n = 14, 46%), intracranial EEG
using subdural electrodes (n = 2, 6%), PET (n = 8, 26%), ictal and/
or interictal single-photon emission computed tomography (n = 4,
13%) and/or intracranial electric stimulation (n = 3, 10%, Tables 1
and 2 and Supplementary Table 1) (Knowlton, 2004; Kurian et al.,
2007). MRI brain scans were normalized to the smoothed T1 tem-
plate using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/ spm/software/spm5)
(Ashburner and Friston, 2005). As unified segmentation models give
Table 2 Patient characteristics in patients with heautoscopy
Patient Diagnosis Lesion site Lesion side Lesion analysis
HAS 1 Epilepsy (dysembryoblastic tumour) Temporal lobe, insula Left MRI, EEG, PET
HAS 2 Epilepsy Temporal lobe, insula Left MRI, iEEG
HAS 3 Epilepsy (dysembryoblastic tumour) Temporal lobe, mesio-basal Left MRI, EEG, PETa
HAS 4 Epilepsy (focal dysplasia, after resection) Temporo-parietal lobe, insula Left MRI, iEEG
HAS 5 Migraine (atrophy) Parieto-occipital lobe Bilateral MRI
HAS 6 Epilepsy (lesional) Insula and temporo-parieto-occipital lobe Left MRI, EEG
HAS 7 Epilepsy (astrocytoma) Temporal lobe, insula Right CT, MRI, EEG, PETa
HAS 8 Epilepsy (astrocytoma) Temporal lobe, insula Left CT, EEGa
HAS 9 Epilepsy (hippocampal sclerosis) Temporal lobe, mesial Left MRI, SPECTa
a Enough imaging data were available for accurate tracing onto a normalized standard template brain. No normalization of the original data was possible in these cases.
iEEG = intracranial electroencephalography; SPECT = single-photon emission computed tomography.
Table 3 Patient characteristics in patients with autoscopic hallucination
Patient Diagnosis Lesion site Lesion side Lesion
analysis
AH 1 Epilepsy (glioblastoma) Parieto-occipital lobe Left MRI, EEG
AH 2 Epilepsy (focal dysplasia) Parietal lobe Right MRI, EEG
AH 3 Ischaemic lesion (eclampsia) Occipital lobe Right MRI
AH 4 Epilepsy (parasitical lesion) Occipital lobe Right MRI, EEG
AH 5 Epilepsy (intracerebral haematoma) Parieto-occipital lobe Right MRI, EEGa
AH 6 Epilepsy (oligodendroglioma) Occipital lobe Right MRI, EEGa
AH 7 Tumour (postoperative lesion) Occipital lobe Right MRI
a Enough imaging data were available for accurate tracing onto a normalized standard template brain. No normalization of the original data was possible in these cases.
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the most precise registration of lesioned structural images (Crinion
et al., 2007), no cost-function masking was necessary. Functional
imaging (PET, single-photon emission computed tomography) was
normalized using SPM5 and co-registered to the normalized MRI
scans. Intracranial electrodes were co-registered to the normalized
MRI scans for each patient using the Cartool software developed by
Denis Brunet (http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm). Lesions
were subsequently traced manually, slice by slice, either on the indi-
vidual normalized brain scans or on the T1-weighted images using
MRIcron (Rorden et al., 2007). The manual tracing on the template
brain was only done when confidence could be achieved for matching
corresponding slices between the lesioned brain and the template
brain. Thus, structural lesions were analysed by MRI, and if MRI
was not available, by CT.
In a few patients, intracranial electrical stimulation and intracranial
recordings were available and used to localize the seizure onset zone
(Patient HAS 2 and Controls 1, 2 and 11). In this group of patients,
the lesion site was defined as the location of the implanted electrodes
(on the standard T1 template) where the seizure onset was found
(plus an additional radius of 10 mm around the ictal onset zone).
No patients with unclear lesion boundaries, generalized seizures or
metallic artefacts were included in the analysis. Lesion volumes
(volume of interest) were determined as the sum of all voxels com-
promising the traced lesion in all slices and were spatially smoothed
using a 5-mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel and a
threshold of 0.5.
Lesion overlap and statistical analysis
For lesion overlap and statistical analysis, we used MRIcron and
non-parametric mapping, which is part of the MRIcron software pack-
age (Rorden et al., 2007). In a first step, simple voxel-based lesion
overlap analysis establishing the anatomical subregions of maximal
lesion overlap for heautoscopy and autoscopic hallucinations was per-
formed. In a second step, non-parametric voxel-based lesion symptom
mapping analysis (Bates et al., 2003), contrasting autoscopic hallucin-
ations and heautoscopy against the control group, was performed on
the hemisphere that was significantly more often affected (as con-
firmed by the binomial test, see later in the text). The control group
was matched for the hemispheric predominance and the cerebral vas-
cular territories, as defined by the lesion overlap (e.g. left anterior for
heautoscopy and right posterior for autoscopic hallucinations). We
used the Liebermeister test and corrected the results for multiple com-
parisons using a 5% false discovery rate (FDR). The Liebermeister test
is a non-parametric implementation of a two-group comparison on a
binary variable. It is more appropriate than the 2 test (Rorden et al.,
2007). We only included voxels affected in at least 30% for all sub-
sequent analyses. Right versus left hemispheric involvement was tested
with a binomial distribution, with an expected frequency of 0.5.
The distribution of phenomenological data and associated symptoms
and neurological findings was analysed using the 2 test and the Fisher
exact test, respectively (Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
Results
Phenomenology
For illustration, several characteristic clinical, phenomenological
and neuroradiological findings are described for two patients
with heautoscopy and two patients with autoscopic hallucinations.
Details for the remaining patients are in the online Supplementary
material.
Heautoscopy
Patient 1
Patient 1 was a 44-year-old right-handed man known for pharmaco-
resistant epilepsy and complex partial seizures. Neurological exam-
ination was normal. Interictal EEG showed slow waves with spikes
over the left anterior and medial temporal region. Ictal EEG showed a
seizure onset in the left anterior and medial temporal lobe. CT and
MRI revealed a cystic lesion in the left temporal lobe, including parts
of the left insula, enhancing contrast medium in its posterior parts.
A dysembryoblastic tumour was diagnosed (see Fig. 1A for individual
lesion analysis).
The episodes always started with an epigastric aura and a sen-
sation of intense fear. He then saw a man in his right visual field.
Although vision was blurred, the patient could tell that this man
was very familiar to him. The man spoke in an incomprehensible
way, while the patient (according to his relatives) suffered from
language problems at these moments. The patient reported that
he increasingly felt that the man he was seeing was himself. He
felt as if he was ‘duplicated’ (abnormal self-identification). During
the full episode, the patient did not experience abnormal
self-location and always experienced to perceive the world and
the autoscopic body from the normal first-person perspective.
Postictally, the patient was depressed and often cried.
Patient 2
Patient 2 was a right-handed 15-year-old girl suffering from
pharmaco-resistant epilepsy. During invasive presurgical evalu-
ation, the seizure onset was localized to the left medial temporal
lobe, followed by rapid spread of the ictal activity to the left
insula. MRI revealed a left hippocampal sclerosis. Postictal neuro-
psychological testing revealed a discrete deficit in verbal memory
(see Fig. 1B for individual lesion analysis).
The initial ictal sensation was characterized by an ascending
epigastric sensation, nausea and the urge to vomit. The patient
further mentioned a generalized feeling of extreme warmth (as if
her body was burning) and that she was not able to breathe (as if
someone was trying to strangulate her). This was followed by the
visual impression that a transparent body was leaving her body.
The patient indicated that she felt that this body was her ‘soul’
leaving her body and that she could actually see a white, but
transparent, body above her. The autoscopic body (her ‘soul’)
was described as looking like the patient; in particular, she men-
tioned that she could clearly recognize the face and the upper
parts of the trunk. Despite the highly realistic nature of these ex-
periences, the patient remained critical of them and was aware
that she was lying in the hospital bed. Towards the end of the
seizure, the patient reported to feel that ‘the soul’ re-entered the
body. The patient was agitated throughout the entire episode. To
summarize, the patient reported strong self-identification with the
physical as well as the autoscopic body, but did not experience
any changes of self-location and the first-person perspective.
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Autoscopic hallucinations
Patient 1
The patient was a right-handed 30-year-old man who suffered
from complex partial seizures due to a glioblastoma in the left
parietal lobe. The clinical examination was normal. The interictal
EEG revealed a slowing over the left parietal lobe without any
epileptiform activity. After resection of the tumour, no further
seizures were noted.
During one episode, the patient saw his autoscopic body stand-
ing on top of a taxi for 10 s. The autoscopic body appeared as if
observing the scenery. There was no change of the first-person
perspective (e.g. the patient did not see the scene from the taxi),
no sensation of disembodiment and no affinity with the autoscopic
body (normal self-location and self-identification). The episodes
were initially characterized by the sensation of losing balance, to-
gether with palpitations and a weakness of the right arm.
Patient 2
The patient (Maillard et al., 2004) was a right-handed 36-year-old
woman known for intractable partial epilepsy. Seizures occurred
weekly and included motor automatisms and tonic posturing of
the trunk and upper and lower limbs bilaterally. She further
described three kinds of initial ictal symptoms: palinopsia (persist-
ence of an image of an object that she had actually seen a few
seconds before), macroasomatognosia (sensation of inflation of
the nose, head and sometimes whole body) and autoscopy. The
interictal EEG showed subcontinuous right parieto-central parox-
ysms, and the ictal EEG (associated with the autoscopic hallucin-
ations) showed epileptic discharge over the right parieto-central
area. MRI showed focal cortical thickening and subcortical increase
in FLAIR signal in the right inferior parietal gyrus, consistent with
the diagnosis of focal dysplasia.
The patient described seeing the image of her face and her
chest (sometimes her whole body) as in a mirror. The autoscopic
body had a vague oval contour, was of normal size and colour and
showed no particular expression. Self-location, the first-person
perspective and self-identification remained normal.
Summary of heautoscopy autoscopic
hallucinations and heautoscopy
All patients with heautoscopy reported a strong affinity and
self-identification with the autoscopic body (significantly different
from autoscopic hallucinations, P5 0.01; see later in the text). The
autoscopic body was seen in all cases, not only in front view but
Figure 1 Individual lesion analysis in heautoscopy. Individual lesion analysis for Patients 1–9 (corresponding to A–I). Lesions are displayed
on a standard template brain.
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also in side and back views (P50.01). Five patients with heauto-
scopy reported alterations of the direction and the position of the
first-person perspective (55%, P = 0.029). Only two patients
with heautoscopy reported bi-location (22%, not significant).
None of the patients reported to see the autoscopic body in a
mirror-reversed way (P = 0.01), and three patients reported echo-
praxia (33%, not significant). Fig. 2 summarizes the phenomeno-
logical characteristics of the patients with heautoscopy and
autoscopic hallucinations.
None of the patients with autoscopic hallucinations reported
abnormal self-location, first-person perspective or self-identifica-
tion; self-location and the origin of the first-person perspective
as well as self-identification were always centred in the physical
body. Patients described the autoscopic body as a mere visual
body or a mirror reflection without experiencing any particular
affinity (normal self-identification). The autoscopic body was usu-
ally seen in front of them (85%) and in a mirror-reversed way
(57%). Shared movement (echopraxia) was reported by one pa-
tient (14%). For more detailed statistical results, see the online
Supplementary material.
Control group
The control group for heautoscopy consisted of eight patients
(mean age: 31.5 years, four female, six right handed, two ambi-
dextrous) suffering from complex visual hallucinations due to
damage of the left temporal, temporo-parietal or frontal cortex
(Supplementary Table 1). Hallucinations included seeing a shad-
owy person, children, persons moving back and forth, two female
persons (daughter and wife) and faces. Another six patients (mean
age: 53.3 years, two female, all right handed) suffering from
damage to the right posterior parietal and/or right occipital
cortex were used as a control group for the patients suffering
from autoscopic hallucinations. The latter patients also suffered
from complex visual hallucinations and all reported seeing
people (e.g. daughter, little people and faces). None of the pa-
tients of the control groups reported any particular affinity or
self-identification with the seen persons, or a change of the
first-person perspective or self-location.
Associated symptoms and neurological
deficits
Fig. 3 shows the associated symptoms and neurological deficits in
the patients with heautoscopy and autoscopic hallucinations.
Five patients with heautoscopy experienced strong emotional
sensations (fear, pleasure, anger) with the autoscopic phenom-
enon (55%), whereas none of the patients with autoscopic hallu-
cinations reported a particular emotional state (P = 0.029).
Visceroceptive sensations (33%, not significant), vestibular sensa-
tions (55%, P = 0.09) and feelings of echopraxia (not significant)
were more frequent (but not statistically significant) in the heau-
toscopy group as compared with the group with autoscopic
hallucinations.
The neurological examination was abnormal in six patients with
heautoscopy (67%) and in five patients with autoscopic hallucin-
ations (72%, not significant), but differed in the type of deficit.
Five patients with autoscopic hallucinations (72%) had a (mostly)
contralesional visual field deficit or associated visual symptoms
(and usually perceived the autoscopic image in the part of the
visual field that was affected). Visual deficits were only found in
two patients with heautoscopy (22%, P = 0.05). A sensorimotor
deficit was present in five patients with heautoscopy (55%), but
only one patient with autoscopic hallucinations (14%, P = 0.09).
Neuropsychological testing yielded a deficit in five patients with
heautoscopy (55%; including verbal memory and visuo-spatial
Figure 2 Phenomenology during heautoscopy (HAS) and autoscopic hallucinations (AH). Asterisks indicate a significant difference be-
tween the two groups (2 test and Fisher exact test, respectively).
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deficits, frontal signs), whereas all patients with autoscopic hallu-
cinations had a normal neuropsychological examination (P = 0.02).
For more detailed statistical results, see Fig. 3 and the online
Supplementary material.
Lesion overlap
Heautoscopy
The left temporal lobe (superior, middle and inferior temporal
gyrus), including mesial temporal lobe (amygdala, hippocampus),
and/or the left insula were affected in seven patients with
heautoscopy. Two patients had left temporo-parietal lesions
(including the angular gyrus and postcentral gyrus). One patient
with heautoscopy suffered from exclusive left parietal lobe
damage, and in one patient, the right insula was affected. The
left hemispheric predominance was confirmed by statistical ana-
lysis (P = 0.03, binomial test, two tailed). Lesion overlap analysis
highlighted the left posterior insula (centred on MNI coordinates
x = 40, y = 1, z = 10), which was found to be involved in five
out of eight patients with heautoscopy with left brain damage
(Fig. 4).
Figure 3 Associated symptoms in heautoscopy (HAS) and autoscopic hallucinations (AH). Asterisks indicate a significant difference
between the two groups (2 test and Fisher exact test, respectively).
Figure 4 Lesion overlap in heautoscopy. Lesion overlap analysis highlighted the left posterior insula (centred on MNI coordinates
x = 40, y = 1, z = 10), which was found to be involved in five out of nine patients with heautoscopy. The number of overlapping
lesions is illustrated by colour, from violet (n = 2) to yellow (maximal lesion overlap, n = 5).
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Autoscopic hallucinations
In patients with autoscopic hallucination (n = 7), the right hemi-
sphere was affected in six patients, and the left hemisphere only in
one patient (P = 0.12, binomial test, two tailed). The occipital lobe
was affected in five patients with autoscopic hallucinations, the
parietal lobe in one patient and the parieto-occipital lobe in two
patients. The lesion overlap map highlighted a subregion in the
right occipital lobe, more specifically the right superior occipital
gyrus and the right cuneus (centred on MNI coordinates x = 20,
y = 84, z = 20), as the area involved in five of six patients
with autoscopic hallucinations due to right hemisphere brain
damage (Fig. 5).
Statistical lesion analysis
These results were corroborated and extended by statistical lesion
overlap comparison (non-parametric mapping) (Rorden et al.,
2007). Lesion overlap contrast yielded maximal involvement of
the left posterior insula (centred on MNI coordinates x = 40,
y = 2, z = 11; Z-score = 3.31, P50.01, corrected for FDR) for
heautoscopy as compared with the control group (Fig. 6).
Autoscopic hallucinations did not significantly differ from the con-
trol group with complex visual hallucinations, which were due to
lesion to the right parietal or occipital cortex (Z-score = 2.18,
P40.05, corrected for FDR).
Discussion
Here we demonstrate phenomenological differences as well as
distinct neuroanatomical substrates for heautoscopy and auto-
scopic hallucinations. Heautoscopy was characterized by a strong
disturbance of bodily self-consciousness, including altered
self-identification and emotional changes and affinity with the
autoscopic body that were frequently associated with changes of
the first-person perspective and self-location. Moreover, our ana-
lysis associated abnormal vestibular sensations, neuropsychological
deficits and contralesional sensorimotor, but not visual, deficits
with heautoscopy. This was different during autoscopic hallucin-
ations. Self-identification, self-location and the first-person per-
spective remained centred at the physical body and the
pseudo-hallucinatory autoscopic body was often experienced in
a mirror-reversed way, and frequently seen on the side of the
contralesional visual field deficit. Autoscopic hallucinations were
not associated with neuropsychological or sensorimotor deficits.
Using state-of-the-art lesion symptom mapping techniques in
the—to date—largest sample of patients suffering from heauto-
scopy and autoscopic hallucinations, we were able to demonstrate
distinct neuroanatomical substrates for both autoscopic phenom-
ena: heautoscopy was linked to the left posterior insula and adja-
cent cortical regions, whereas autoscopic hallucinations were
Figure 5 Lesion overlap in autoscopic hallucinations. (A) The lesion overlap map highlighted a subregion of voxels in the right occipital
lobe, more specifically the right superior occipital gyrus and the right cuneus (centred on MNI coordinates x = 20, y = 84, z = 20), as the
area involved in five patients with autoscopic hallucinations. The number of overlapping lesions is illustrated by colour, from violet (n = 2)
to red (maximal lesion overlap, n = 5). (B) 3D rendering of the lesion overlap in patients with autoscopic hallucinations.
Figure 6 Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping in heauto-
scopy. Lesion overlap contrast yielded maximal involvement of
the left posterior insula (centred on MNI coordinates x = 40,
y = 2, z = 11; Z-score = 3.31, P50.01, corrected for FDR) for
heautoscopy as compared with the control group. Only signifi-
cant voxels are displayed.
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associated with damage to the occipital cortex. Later in the text,
we discuss the relevance of our findings in the context of the
existing models for autoscopic phenomena and recent findings
from cognitive neuroscience and neurology on body representa-
tion and bodily self-consciousness. We next discuss autoscopic
hallucinations and then focus on heautoscopy and the role of
the insular cortex as a multisensory integration area, comparing
the present findings with the recent implication of the right tem-
poro-parietal junction in bodily self-consciousness and out-of-body
experiences (Ionta et al., 2011).
The present data show that autoscopic hallucinations are asso-
ciated with visual deficits and caused by damage to the right su-
perior occipital gyrus and the right cuneus in extrastriate visual
cortex. This location of brain damage was similar to that in the
control group, compatible with the known implication of extrastri-
ate visual cortex in other complex visual hallucinations (Cogan,
1973; Manford and Andermann, 1998). Because complex visual
hallucinations may be restricted to the affected visual hemifield
and because this was observed in the present patients with auto-
scopic hallucinations, we suggest that autoscopic hallucinations are
due to damage in the extrastriate visual cortex. This damage likely
includes visual body perception regions such as the extrastriate
body area (Downing et al., 2001; Astafiev et al., 2004), the fusi-
form body area (Peelen and Downing, 2005) and the fusiform
face area (Kanwisher et al., 1997), although this has not been
directly tested in the present study. All regions have been linked
to the perception and recognition of the human body, body parts
and faces. Importantly, the right fusiform face area and fusiform
body area also respond to one’s own face (Uddin et al., 2005) and
one’s own body (Hodzic et al., 2009). The extrastriate body area
has also been shown to respond to sensorimotor signals, compat-
ible with a role of these regions beyond mere visual processing
(Astafiev et al., 2004). However, we note that most of the lesions
in the patients with autoscopic hallucinations were within the oc-
cipital cortex and that the maximal lesion overlap was more dorsal
and posterior compared with the right fusiform body area and
fusiform face area (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Peelen and
Downing, 2005), as well as the right extrastriate body area
(Downing et al., 2001). Accordingly, we cannot exclude that
autoscopic hallucinations have resulted from interference with
lower-level visual regions. As all three aspects of bodily
self-consciousness were normal in patients with autoscopic hallu-
cinations, the present data suggest that damage to the occipital
cortex did not interfere with self-location, self-identification or
the first-person perspective. As argued previously and extending
related accounts of supernumerary phantom limbs (Ramachandran
and Hirstein, 1998) and autoscopic hallucinations (Bolognini et al.,
2010), we argue that autoscopic hallucinations and autoscopy
(i.e. the seeing of one’s own body in extrapersonal space as is
present during all autoscopic phenomena; Brugger et al., 1997;
Brugger, 2002) are caused by disintegration between visual and
somatosensory signals (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009). Despite the inherent fascination and interest of the phe-
nomenon for clinician and patient, the present data show that
autoscopic hallucinations do not represent a disorder of bodily
self-consciousness, as is the case in heautoscopy.
During heautoscopy, we found abnormal self-identification in all
patients characterized by the experience of a strong emotional
affinity towards and self-identification with the autoscopic body.
Lesion overlap and statistical lesion analysis revealed that
heautoscopy was caused by damage to or interference with the
left posterior insula. The posterior insular cortex is a multisensory
integration area, including somatosensory, motor, visual, auditory,
vestibular and limbic signals (Augustine, 1996; Flynn, 1999).
Schneider et al. (1993) observed large and often bilateral somato-
sensory receptive fields in the granular insular cortex. The posterior
insula has also been implicated in disownership of body parts in
neurological patients (e.g. somatoparaphrenia) (Baier and Karnath,
2008). Patients with somatoparaphrenia report the sensation that
a certain body part, usually the left arm, is no longer their own,
but belongs to another person (misattribution of a body part, ab-
normal self-identification) (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). It has been
suggested that the loss of ownership and the misattribution are a
result of abnormal integration of sensorimotor and visual cues due
to damage to the posterior insular cortex (Baier and Karnath,
2008). An implication of the insula in bodily self-consciousness is
further supported by evidence from neuroimaging studies on ma-
nipulations of hand ownership and the related concept of agency
through visuo-tactile and visuo-motor stimulations (Farrer et al.,
2003; Tsakiris et al., 2007). These data and the present data
on heautoscopy are compatible with the proposal that abnormal
integration of somatosensory, visual and motor signals in the
posterior insular cortex could result not only in misattribution
of a body part (e.g. somatoparaphrenia, rubber hand illusion)
but also in abnormal body ownership for a full body (e.g.
self-identification with the autoscopic body).
However, a disintegration model based on somatosensory,
motor and visual own-body signals as put forward for somatopar-
aphrenia (Baier and Karnath, 2008) and autoscopic hallucinations
does not account for the observation that patients with heauto-
scopy experience a close emotional affinity towards the autoscopic
body (Brugger et al., 1997) and the frequent association of
heautoscopy with the sensation of detachment from own bodily
processing (e.g. depersonalization) (Devinsky et al., 1989; Brugger
et al., 1997) and visceroceptive sensations (e.g. epigastric aura,
vomiting, palpitation). We note that this aspect is critically absent
in patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experi-
ences (Brugger et al., 1997; Blanke et al., 2004). Of relevance for
heautoscopy, however, it has been suggested that the posterior
insular cortex links somatosensory signals from the secondary som-
atosensory cortex with signals from limbic structures, such as the
amygdala, the perirhinal cortex and the cingulate cortex (Friedman
et al., 1986). This is supported by recent functional MRI work in
humans by Ebisch et al. (2011), showing that activity in the left
posterior insular cortex distinguished between the physical experi-
ence and observation of touch, but only if the touch was of af-
fective significance (e.g. pleasant versus neutral touch). In line
with these results, Morrison et al. (2011) found that activity in
the posterior insular cortex is associated with both seeing and
feeling pleasant touch. In addition, it has been suggested that
activity in the insular cortex reflects abnormal perception of
touch in the case of vision–touch synaesthesia (Blakemore et al.,
2005), e.g. the case where the observation of another person
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being touched is experienced as tactile stimulation on the equiva-
lent part of one’s own body. Thus, the posterior insular cortex has
been proposed not only to encode emotionally relevant somato-
sensory experience for both self and other, but also to distinguish
whether an emotionally relevant somatosensory stimulus has been
delivered to our body or to someone else’s body (Ebisch et al.,
2011; Morrison et al., 2011).
Moreover, the posterior insular cortex has recently been impli-
cated in the first-order cortical representation of pain and internal
bodily states (visceroception), including homeostatic, gastrointes-
tinal and cardiac signals (Augustine, 1996; Damasio et al., 2000;
Craig, 2002, 2009). The further processing of this afferent vis-
ceral–autonomic information and the integration with limbic pro-
cessing in the (anterior) insular cortex (together with the anterior
cingulate cortex) are thought to be of crucial importance for emo-
tions, interoceptive awareness and self-awareness (Damasio et al.,
2000; Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Picard, 2010). Extending
earlier theories of emotion (James, 1884; Lange, 1922), studies
have recently suggested that the mapping of internal bodily
states and emotional experience in the insular cortex is crucial
for conscious feelings generally and human self-consciousness
(Damasio et al., 2000; Craig, 2002, 2009; Damasio, 2003). With
respect to the present data on patients with heautoscopy, recent
studies using functional MRI have shown increased insular activity
not only during the subjective experience of one’s own feelings
and emotions but also when a familiar other is experiencing the
same emotion (Singer et al., 2004). It has thus been argued that
these shared networks for self and other may form the basis for
emotional perspective taking and empathy (Singer et al., 2009).
Our observation that heautoscopy after insula damage is fre-
quently associated with heightened or altered emotional states
and visceroceptive sensations, such as palpitations, epigastric
aura or vomiting [although only found in 33% of the present
patient sample, but see Sollier (1903) for a visceroceptive account
of heautoscopy], may be related to interference with such brain
representations. Based on these findings, we speculate that
damage to the posterior insular cortex results in a breakdown of
self–other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experi-
ence due to a disintegration of somatosensory and visual signals
with emotional (and/or interoceptive) own-body signals. We
speculate that the appearance of the autoscopic body and the
referral of self-generated emotional states and feelings to the
autoscopic body are a consequence of this disintegration, leading
to abnormal emotional affinity and abnormally strong
self-identification with the autoscopic body.
Many patients with heautoscopy also suffer from abnormal
self-location and first-person perspective such as alternating
self-location and first-person perspective between the physical
and the illusory body and sensation of bi-location. We argue
that these changes are caused by additional abnormal integration
of vestibular signals (as proposed previously by Gru¨sser and
Landis, 1991; Blanke et al., 2004; and Blanke and Mohr, 2005)
with other bodily signals. Our data suggest that the former disin-
tegration (somatosensory–visual signals with emotional–interocep-
tive signals) is present in all patients with heautoscopy, whereas
the vestibular disturbance was only found in about half of them.
Previous work revealed that heautoscopy is frequently associated
with vestibular disturbances (Blanke and Mohr, 2005) and was
confirmed in the present study (55%). The posterior insular
cortex in the right and left hemisphere is part of the ‘vestibular
cortical network’, together with the temporo-parietal junction, an-
terior parietal cortex and premotor cortex (Guldin and Gru¨sser,
1998; Lopez and Blanke, 2011). Other illusory own-body percep-
tions, such as out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004), the
misattribution of body parts (Heydrich et al., 2010) and deperson-
alization (Sang et al., 2006), are also frequently associated with
vestibular sensations and have been linked to the temporo-parietal
junction (Simeon et al., 2000; Blanke et al., 2004; Heydrich et al.,
2011) and the posterior insular cortex (Landtblom et al., 2011).
Blanke et al. (2004) proposed that abnormal integration of
mainly otolithic vestibular signals with other bodily signals (from
vision, proprioception, touch) results in the abnormal elevated
self-location and first-person perspective, characteristic of
out-of-body experiences. Moreover, links between the vestibular
system and bodily self-consciousness have also been revealed ex-
perimentally. Thus, vestibular stimulation has been shown to alter
body ownership and somatosensory processing, both in patients
with somatoparaphrenia (Bisiach et al., 1991; Rode et al., 1992)
and healthy participants (Lopez et al., 2008, 2010, 2012; Ferre
et al., 2011). Thus, it has been suggested that vestibular pro-
cessing might be a central aspect of body ownership and embodi-
ment (Lenggenhager et al., 2008; Lopez et al., 2008). During
heautoscopy, vestibular sensations are variable, often related to
the semicircular canals, and less prominent as compared with
out-of-body experiences. We argue that—although changes in
self-location and the first-person perspective in heautoscopy are
less prominent than those during out-of-body experiences—their
more variable and dynamic character (and association with
abnormal emotional–interoceptive signals) may be related to the
sensation of bi-location that is present in heautoscopy, but absent
in out-of-body experiences, the latter being characterized by a
clear psychological separation between the autoscopic and the
physical body.
Why was left, but not right, damage to the posterior insula
associated with heautoscopy? A previous literature review without
quantitative lesion analysis also linked the left temporo-parietal
cortex to heautoscopy (Blanke and Mohr, 2005). This lateralization
is compatible with the presence of auditory verbal hallucinations in
patients with heautoscopy that have been linked to the left hemi-
sphere and the left temporo-parietal cortex in particular (Hubl
et al., 2004). Auditory verbal manifestations are generally absent
in patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experi-
ences. We can currently only speculate why right posterior insula
damage was not associated with heautoscopy. As suggested by
Craig et al. (2009), there may be functional differences concerning
self-processing in right versus left insular cortex. Such right versus
left insula differences may also concern language (left) versus spa-
tial (right) processing differences or vestibular processing differ-
ences (left, semicanals; right, otoliths) (Blanke, 2012). We also
note that previous neuroimaging work in healthy subjects reported
bilateral temporo-parietal activations in experimentally induced
changes in self-location and first-person perspective (Ionta et al.,
2011). Future work is necessary to investigate right versus left
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temporo-parietal activations (including the insula) with respect to
emotional, vestibular, language and spatial processing.
In conclusion, we argue that heautoscopy is caused by damage
to the left posterior insular cortex, leading to a disintegration of
exteroceptive bodily signals (somatosensory, visual) with emo-
tional and/or visceral corporeal signals. Such disintegration results
in abnormal self-identification and heightened emotional affinity
that patients with heautoscopy experience for the autoscopic
body. Projecting self-generated emotional states and feelings
onto the autoscopic body, while also experiencing detachment
of emotional sensations and somatosensory processing for the
own body [e.g. inner hollowness and depersonalization (Brugger,
2002)], is thus the fundamental pathomechanism in heautoscopy
and is associated with the appearance of not just a seen second
own body, but a ‘true’ double, often experienced as another self.
Such emotional–somatosensory disintegration may lead to levels of
self-identification that are elevated for both the physical and the
autoscopic body, making self–other distinction and self-location
ambiguous. If accompanied by additional abnormal vestibular sig-
nals, further changes in first-person perspective and self-location
may result, leading to bi-location and the sensation of
self-duplication, likely the strongest form of heautoscopic dissoci-
ation. Neurological and neuropsychological symptoms and lesion
location differed in autoscopic hallucinations, highlighting visual
and visuo-somatosensory mechanisms in extrastriate and occipital
cortex. Given the normality of bodily self-consciousness during
autoscopic hallucinations, we speculate that autoscopic hallucin-
ations are a disorder of own-body representation due to
visuo-tactile disintegration caused by damage to the ventral
visual pathways in proximity to the extrastriate body area, fusi-
form body area or fusiform face area.
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